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NOTES
A Remedy for the Discharge of Professional
Employees Who Refuse to Perform Unethical or
Illegal Acts: A Proposal in Aid of Professional

Ethics
I.

INTRODUCTION*

In his book, Unaccountable Accounting, Abraham Briloff
voiced a plea to the professionals in his field:
In essence I am seeking to impose a "Nuremberg Code" on each of us

engaged in our professional pursuit, a code whereby we commit ourselves to
implement a standard of fairness, even though a contrary result could be
subsumed under GAAP. And we should adhere to the code in spite of "superior
orders" or client's directives. This is an awesome burden which I am imposing
on the individual-but it is only through the acceptance of just such a burden
that accountants will have a fair claim to professional recognition.'

Why would a distinguished scholar voice a plea for conduct that
plainly is required both by statute and professional codes of conduct? Perhaps the answer to this type of question is found in the
spectacle of Watergate,2 the increasing number of criminal convictions against attorneys and accountants, and a general public distrust of the honesty and integrity of many professions. For example,
in 1973 approximately 500 suits by corporations against accounting
firms were pending. Further, the plethora of attorneys involved in
Watergate evidences a need for ethical backbone in the conduct of
professional affairs. Taken together, these events demonstrate that
the public is demanding strengthened controls over the conduct of
professional activity.
Because of their immense effects on the daily lives of the pub* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor L. Harold Levinson for his
aid in the preparation of this Note.
1. A. BRILOFF, UNACCOUNTABLE AccomIrNG 335 (1972).
2. A former president of the ABA, Chesterfield Smith, has stated:

Watergate has sent a pall over the country and a shadow over our profession. While it is
patently unfair to blame our profession for Watergage just because many participants
happen to be lawyers, I do think that the blame that has been cast on us ultimately will
have a healthy effect on the profession and a positive influence on the country.
60 A.B.A.J. 1041 (1974); similarly, Paul Carrington has stated that "The Watergate planning
and execution is deemed by the public to have been managed by lawyers. . . [and] they,
in the public opinion, are very largely responsible for the crisis we all face." Carrington, The
Ethical Crisis of American Lawyers, 36 U. Prrr. L. REv. 35, 49 (1974). See also the recent
comments of the current ABA president James D. Fellers: "Since Watergate, lawyers have
stood up with the public and loudly demanded that the profession be rid of those who are
not worthy either by character or ability, to practice within it." ABA Release, (Tuesday,
March 11, 1975); Stein, The Silent Complicity of Watergate, 43 AMER. SCHOL. 21 (1973).
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lic, 3 professionals are subjected to a high standard of ethical conduct. A professional is impressed with a public trust and responsibility, a position in which he is guided not only by his own conscience, but also by criminal statutes, state licensing statutes, the
regulations of many federal agencies and his professional code of
ethics.4 The current ethical crisis, however, demonstrates that these
controls do not always induce proper professional conduct. The
sanctions may be applied selectively and may depend in large part
upon peer reaction. Thus, professional discipline may be made difficult because of the fraternal stigma attached to the reporting of or
testifying about professional misconduct.
Proper conduct of professional affairs may be encouraged by the
creation of an environment in which ethical conduct is made as easy
as possible. To the extent that the pressure to engage in unethical
action is removed the individual will be free to act in accordance
with both the pertinent statutes and his professional code. These
pressures may take the form of missed filing deadlines, a burdensome workload, or client demands for a particular result. Particularly affected, however, is the employee professional, who in many
situations may be involved in an activity that is or borders on the
illegal or unethical. A good example would be an associate in a law
firm, 5 or an accountant employed as a junior auditor in a CPA firm.'
3. The enormity of the effect of professionals' effect upon the public can be seen in the
Equity Funding swindle. [1973 Decisions] CCH FED.SEC. L. REP. 93,917 (Complaint, C.D.
Cal., April 3, 1973). Further, it is estimated that 10% of all doctors had malpractice suits
pending in 1974 and in that year California alone saw 30 awards over $300,000. 78 U.S. NEws
& W. REP., Jan. 20, 1975, at 53. Attorneys and accountants were chosen for consideration
because they are most often in the public eye and are regulated extensively by their professional organizations. The medical profession also serves as a useful model for the instant
situation, but the complex nature of the medical chain of command and hospital administration precludes ease of comparison. It can be seen that the situation of an "abusive discharge"
could arise perhaps more frequently in the medical context. A nurse or intern could be ordered
to take certain steps that they believe are unethical. Recent cases have held that the nurse
is under a duty to resist such an order. See Darling v. Charleston, 33 Ill.
2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
253 (1965); AMERICAN NURSES AssOCAION, CODE FOR NURSES (1968) as cited in I. MURCHISON
& T. NIcHoLs, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF NURSING PRAacIE 468, 470-71 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as A.N.A. NURSES CONE]. ". . . the maintenance of competence in practice is the personal
responsibility of each individual practitioner. . . .Neither physician's orders nor the employing agency's policies relieve the nurse of responsibility for her own nursing actions or
judgments. . . .Whenever a practice threatens the patient's health, welfare, or safety, the
nurse has no choice but to take appropriate action on his behalf. Id. at 470-71.
4. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmaary (December 1974); AMEIucAN INsTrnr OF
CERTIFIED PUBuc AccouNTANTs, Code of ProfessionalEthics (1974).
5. The modem law firm is composed of a group of partners who control the operation
of the firm and a group of associates employed by the firm on a salaried basis. The normal
process of advancement finds an employee becoming a partner anywhere from three to eight
years, depending on the locale and the size of the firm.
6. For large accounting firms, the hierarchy of auditing personnel, in descending order,
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If these types of employees are asked to engage in conduct of questionable propriety, they must recognize the potential problem and
bring it to the attention of their superiors. Hopefully this action
would stimulate a vigorous discussion of the problem within the
firm resulting in an ethically acceptable course of conduct-the
employee either would be shown the propriety of the action or an
alternative course would be taken.7 The current moral climate prevailing in the professions, however, may be such that in many cases
unethical conduct is the expected or that the client's desires justify
any means for their satisfaction. If this is the case, or if discussion
of ethical issues is not encouraged, a chilling effect will occur and
the associate or junior accountant may never raise potential conflicts with other firm members. He may fear that the discussion and
questioning of the proposed action will result in "bad marks" for
performance or in informal sanctions for insubordination. Further,
he may even fear that raising ethical issues or refusing to take action
that he believes unethical will result in his discharge.8
When these pressures exist, the employee's dilemma is placed
in the sharpest perspective. The associate or junior accountant has
worked toward advancement within the firm and termination of his
employment will mean severe repercussions for his family and finances. Likewise, informal sanctions such as the failure to be made
partner or the assignment to an undesirable department are serious
and unpleasant. Thus, the employee may be dissuaded from the
proper exercise of his professional responsibility. Conversely, if
these threats are eliminated, the discussion of ethical issues and
ultimately the resistance to unethical activity will be fostered.
Under current law, however, the mere threat of discharge recomprises "partners,"

"managers" (or "supervisors" or "principals"), "seniors," "semi-

seniors" and "juniors." The partner is usually in charge of several simultaneous audits and
may or may not participate in the field work at the client's premises. The manager will
participate in the field work although he too has multiple engagements at most times. As part
of the engagement, each individual supervises, guides, and then reviews the work of his
subordinates. Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties,28
VAND. L. Rv. 31, 36-37 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Fiflis]. See also MONTGOMERY'S AUDIIG
(8th ed. N. Lenhart & P. Defliese 1957). Professor Fiflis indicates that for the junior accountant involved in the auditing procedure, "bewilderment far outweights understanding."
Given this fact and the anxiousness of subordinates to perform properly, it would be no
surprise to find younger members of the firm somewhat reticent in bringing ethical questions
to the attention of their superiors. Fiflis, supra pote 6, at 37 n.18.
7. This resistance need not be one of hostility. Most often, the employee will sincerely
be in doubt about the wisdom of his position. The normal course of action will be to discuss
the problem with other members of the firm to reach some informal solution. See notes 12628 infra.
8. This exact problem is discussed briefly in INvITATON TO DLJrOOUE 70-71 (J. Hendrix
ed. 1970).
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mains a major impediment to the effectuation of professional ethics,
because the normal contract of the professional is oral and is construed to be "at will"-terminable at any time by either party.?
Thus, under the prevailing theory of professional employment the
discharged attorney or accountant has no remedy at law against the
employer even when the discharge is motivated by the employee's
discussion of ethical issues or his resistance to the orders of his
superiors. Although this problem has not been publicized frequently, the doctrine of employment "at will" has been judicially
considered as it relates to the entire field of employment."0 Indeed,
the problem may be common to a broad range of employees. Examples include discharges for the refusal to date the employee's foreman," for political activity, 12 or for the filing of a workmen's compensation claim.' 3 Recently, a minority of courts have allowed recovery for these types of abusive discharges on the theory that public
policy should foster the employee's moral, political and ethical activity and that therefore discharge for the stated reasons should not
be upheld." Given this trend, the same theory dictates a remedy for
the professional employee because the scope of professional misconduct, whether illegal or unethical, greatly affects the public interest
and thus justifies judicial sanction.
The purpose of this note is to create a right of recovery for
professional employees who are discharged as a result of discussing
unethical activity that has occurred or has been solicited or resisting
9. A 1971 survey found that 51% of the law firms surveyed confirmed the terms of
employment by letter or other written instrument. "Many of the firms, however, volunteered
that they intentionally did not confirm employment of associates in writing because they
wanted to remain flexible if 'other matters came up.'" K. STRONG, A SCHOLASTIC APPROACH
TO LAW Fomm MANAGEMENT 56 (1971). This is not to say, however, that these writings were
the contracts themselves. More than likely, they merely confirmed an already concluded oral
understanding. No information was available as to the inclusion of "for cause" provisions.
10. The problem was first examined by Dean Lawrence Blades who focused on an
"abusive discharge" under an "at will" contract. Here the employee was discharged for
reasons totally unrelated to job performance and found himself without employment and
without remedy against the employer.
What is important is that such abuses, however common or uncommon, should not go
unremedied. Whether for the sake of providing specific justice for the affected individual, deterring a practice which poses an increasingly serious threat to personal freedom
generally, or instilling into employers a general consciousness of and respect for the
individuality of the employee, the law should confront the problem.
Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting The Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404, 1410 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Blades].
11. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
12. See Note, California'sControls on Employer Abuse of Employee PoliticalRights,
22 STAN. L. Rav. 1015 (1970).
13. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
14. See cases cited notes 11-13 supra.
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superior orders that solicit unethical activity. The creation of this
remedy and the resultant job security for the associate or junior
accountant hopefully will foster an atmosphere of free discussion of
ethical issues within professional firms and will induce subordinates
to act consistently with the ethical precepts of the profession.
This note will limit consideration to attorneys and accountants.
They will serve as useful models for all professions" because both
are licensed by the state, are subject to a code of ethics, and are
immensely powerful in the conduct of everyday problems and business affairs. Further, only part of the broad range of professional
employment will be considered. Concern will be limited to private,
non-government employee professionals," excluding from consideration those persons in a single-person practice. 7 Undoubtedly, these
persons face problems similar to professionals in firm practice, but
their current remedies are different and perhaps more readily available."
This note will discuss first the duties demanded of a professional in the proper exercise of his ethical responsibilities, including
conduct demanded both by criminal statutes and by professional
codes of conduct. Secondly, an examination will be made of three
alternatives for the enforcement of professional ethics without the
necessity of a right to recovery in the discharged employee. Thirdly,
the limitations of traditional master-servant theory will be discussed as they relate to a possible cause of action for an "abusive
discharge." Finally, this cause of action will be proposed and a
consideration will be made of the elements of the remedy. Among
the elements considered will be: the standard of proof; the allocation of the burden of proof; the nature and extent of damages;
15. It should be noted that this right of recovery will have important implications for
the conduct of paraprofessionals such as paralegal assistants and paramedical assistants.
Because many of these persons are neither licensed by the state nor bound by the professional
codes of ethics, public policy may not be as strong in favor of granting a recovery for an
"abusive discharge." The dilemma here, however, is that a large potential for public damage
still exists if a paraprofessional fails to resist an illegal or unethical order of his superior.
16. See Dotson, The EmergingDoctrine of Privilegein PublicEmployment, 15 Pus. AD.
REV. 77 (1955); Note, Dismissal of Federal Employees-The Emerging Judicial Role, 66
COLUM. L. Rav. 719 (1966).
17. The ethical dilemma of the sole practitioner arises most often when pressure is
exerted by the client to perform an unethical or illegal act. If the attorney or accountant
refuses to accede to the demand, the client usually will take his business elsewhere. The
creation of a right to recovery in this instance would be unwise because it would form the
basis for recovery in nearly any situation. The critical difference is that the relationship
between the professional and the client is one of an independent contractor. Recovery should
be limited to situations in which the professional is an employee.
18. The independent professional loses only the client and can remedy this by obtaining
alternate business. On the other hand, unionism may be an attractive alternative to the
professional employed by a large corporation. See part Im infra.
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prerequisites to recovery; and protection of the employer from vexatious employee suits.
II.

THE SCOPE OF THE

DUTY

OWED BY THE PROFESSIONAL

Before examining the elements of any proposed remedy for an
"abusively discharged" professional employee, it is necessary to
examine the legal and ethical duties required of an attorney or an
accountant by criminal statutes and the codes of ethics. Potential
legal liability must be discussed because it is one method by which
professional conduct is regulated, albeit ineffectively in many cases.
Nevertheless, the professional must weigh his alternatives and constantly be aware that his actions may constitute a crime.' Similarly, the associate or junior accountant is governed by his professional code of ethics which demands both a minimum of ethical
responsibility and perhaps a duty to "blow the whistle" on unethical
demands. As will be seen, the latter duty may vary between attorneys and accountants.
A.

Criminal Liability

1. Accountants.- Criminal liability of an accountant may
arise in many circumstances unrelated to the accounting function.
For example, a junior accountant can participate in the destruction of records used as evidence or in the giving of perjured testimony. 2 Liability will exist for these types of offenses under both
state and federal criminal statutes, as well as state licensing statutes.
Criminal liability also may be imposed when the accountant is
directly engaged in the accounting or auditing function. The main
sources of liability are found in five federal statutes:

a.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.21
b. The
The Securities Act of 1933.22
c.

23
The Federal Conspiracy Statute.

19. This process will necessarily involve the presentation of a conscious choice to the
subordinate and without knowledge of conscious wrongdoing-scienter, perhaps-liability
will exist only for negligence. There may be criminal liability, however, if the breach of duty
is the result of wanton negligence or reckless disregard for the reasonable standard of care.
U.S. v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970). Also of possible
application is Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974) holding that a
negligent breach of the accountant's duty of inquiry was sufficient to impose criminal liability
for aiding and abetting a violation of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5.
20. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3301 (1955).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1970).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
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d. The Federal False Statements Statute.4
e. The Federal Mail Fraud Statute.2
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, criminal penalties
often are assessed against accountants for making materially false
statements in required reports filed with the SEC. 26 Additionally,
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 established by the SEC have been broadly interpreted to include a variety of potentially fraudulent acts and, as long as a
connection can be shown between the accountant and the purchase or sale of
a covered security, he may come within the criminal provisions of the statute
for willful violations.?

Liability of accountants under the Securities Act of 1933 arises
primarily in the preparation of registration statements and prospectuses. Under the Act an accountant making any untrue statement
of a material fact or omitting to state any material fact in a registration statement may be subject to both fine and prison sentence. 8
Another source of criminal liability for the accountant is the
Federal Conspiracy Statute.9 Under this statute there must be an
agreement to violate another statute (normally one of the other four
listed) and an overt act towards completion of that agreement. It is
noteworthy that this statute was used to obtain convictions in many
of the most significant cases of accountant's liability."
To deter false or fraudulent statements willfully made to any
department or agency of the United States, the Federal False Statements Statute provides for a 10,000 dollar fine and/or a five year
prison term. Liability for accountants arises most often in the filing
of financial and proxy statements. "Since it is generally conceded
that the financial statements are representations of management,
accountant's liability under this statute is restricted to factual as'3
sertions made in their audit report." '

24. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
26. Section 32 of the 1934 Act provides criminal penalties for the willful and knowing

making of a statement in any required report that is false or misleading with respect to any
material fact. 15 U.S.C. § 77ff (1970); see United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 798 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
27. Dunfee & Glein, CriminalLiability of Accountants: Sources and Policies, 9 AMER.

Bus. L.J. 1, 6 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Dunfee & Glein].
28. Securities Act of 1933, § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
30. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006
(1970); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. White, 124
F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1941); Complaint at count 2, SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.,
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,360 (Feb. 3, 1972) [hereinafter

cited as N.S.M. complaint].
31. Dunfee & Glein, supra note 27, at 4.
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Frequently, criminal liability also is assessed against accountants under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute. It is a crime under this
statute to place in the mails "any scheme or artifice to defraud."3 2
Because a separate violation occurs each time an item of this nature
is placed in the mails, 33 the statute allows multiple counts and in
many cases is a primary tool in implementing the securities acts. 4
Thus, the accountant faces liability when certified financial statements are knowingly false and subsequently posed in violation of
this statute.35
2. Attorneys.-Within the scope of his professional employment, the attorney may incur criminal liability for a multitude of
offenses. This occurs because the lawyer often represents a multitude of clients in extreme varieties of situations. Unethical lawyers
will always have opportunities to embezzle trust funds, bribe juries,
destroy evidence, make witnesses unavailable and suborn perjury.
Given this range of offenses, any consideration of attorneys' criminal liability resists compartmentalization. 8
Criminal liability for the attorney often arises under the statutes governing the accountant's liability37 discussed above. Liability
may also arise under state licensing statutes that provide restrictions on the activities of attorneys. For example, if a senior partner
ordered an associate to perform activities constituting the unauthor38
ized practice of law, some states would find criminal liability. It
is sufficient to say that the potential for conscious criminality is
great, and can force the associate-employee into an ethical dilemma.
B.

EthicalResponsibilities

1. Accountants.-The accountant, more than any other professional, 39 is in a difficult ethical position because he must provide
32.

18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).

33. The statute has been interpreted to include the proposition that each mailing constitutes a separate offense. Milan v. United States, 322 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1963); United States
v. Interstate Engineering Corp., 288 F. Supp. 402 (D.N.H. 1967).
34. Isbell, An Overview ofAccountant'sDuties and Liabilities Underthe FederalSecurities Laws and a Closer Look at Whistle-Blowing, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 265 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Isbell].
35. N.S.M. complaint, supra note 30, at count 7.
36. For the purposes of this paper, however, liability will be discussed within the framework of the business-oriented law firm. Although ethical questions that do not involve a
business setting may arise in a law firm, in order to retain a parallel with the considerations
of accountant's liability, consideration will be limited to these situations.
37. See notes 20-25 supra.
38. See People v. Sipper, 61 Cal. App. 2d 844, 142 P.2d 960 (App. Dep't., Super. Ct. of
L.A. 1943); TEN CODE ANN. § 29-303 (Cumin. Supp. 1974).
39. Although the term "professional" is used by many groups as a self-serving term to
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the client with auditing and accounting services and at the same
time maintain an independence from the client since third parties
rely on the audit report." This independence is required by the
accountant's code of ethics and, when lacking, liability may ensue."
In analyzing the ethical responsibility of an accountant, his
countervailing duties must be recognized.42 Rule 301 of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' (AICPA) Code of Professional Ethics provides that "a member shall not disclose any
confidential information obtained in the course of a professional
engagement, except with the consent of the client."4 3 The obvious
purpose of this rule is to facilitate the flow of information between
accountant and client while at the same time, protecting the private
interests of the latter." As stated by one commentator:
It would be fatal to the CPA's own professional cover and damaging to the
whole profession, if the information entrusted to him is improperly revealed.
It is the accountant's duty to respect the confidential relationship with a
client. The man with the loose tongue, the man who cannot keep a secret,
should never attempt to practice public accountancy.4

Rule 301 mentions only the accountant-client relationship. This
elevate group status (viz. barbers, mechanics) certain fields traditionally have been denominated as the "professions." Common to the traditional definition of professions has been (1)
an intellectual discipline capable of formulation on a theoretical line, (2) private practice,
meeting the needs of a clientele on a person-to-person basis, (3) advisory function, (4) a
tradition of service, objective and disinterested, (5) a representative institute, and (6) a code
of conduct. F.A.R. BANNION, PlOFSSIONAL ETmics, THE CONSULTANT PROFESSIONS AND THEIR
CODE 15 (1969). See also Wilensky, The Professionalizationof Everyone? 52 AMER.J. OF Soc.
37 (1964).
40. Liability may be assessed in civil damage suits, criminal proceedings, civil injunctions instituted by the SEC and administrative proceedings by the Commission. See Securities Act of 1933, § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1970); Securites Exchange Act of 1934, § 21, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u (1970); SEC Rule of Practice 2(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1974).
41. This note will focus on the AMERIcAN INSTITUTE OF CERTnFED Pumc AccoUNTArNs'
(AICPA) CODE OF PROFEsSIONAL ETHics (1974) to identify the required standards of conduct
for the instant problem. Additional support is found also in Treasury Department Circular
230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.21 (1974) (knowledge of client's omission), which gives the rules of professional conduct for accountants in practice before the Internal Revenue Service.
42. There is no national code of ethics for accountants. The AICPA's Code of Professional Ethics is the most pervasive restriction, but this does not apply to non-members of
the organization, or to other classes of practitioners. State Boards of Accountancy have
promulgated codes of ethics to include larger numbers of accountants, but these are not
uniform in nature. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-127 (Cumin. Supp. 1974).
43. 2 CCH AICPA, PROF. STANDS. RULE 301 (1974). Arguably, however, the client waives
confidentiality when the CPA is retained to prepare an audit report for publication.
44. CPA-client communications were not privileged under the common law. In many
states, however, the privilege has been established by statute. Among these states are: Ala.,
Ariz., Colo., Fla., Ga., Ill., Ia., La., Md., Mich., Nev., N.M., Penn., Tenn., & Puerto Rico.
See J. CAREY & W. DoHERTY, ErmcAL STANDARDS OF THE AccoUNTING PROFESSION 132 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as CAREY].
45. CAREY,supra note 44, at 131.
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limitation, however, should not be interpreted to mean that subordinates or employees are not bound to confidentiality. Certainly,
the Rule should extend to the CPA's employees."
When the junior accountant learns of illegal or unethical action
by a client, he is faced with a choice of resistance or acquiescence.
The firm could simply withdraw from the engagement upon discovering such wrongdoing, but the junior accountant alone is not in a
position to do so. Moreover, his discussion of the proprieties of the
situation or his resistance to the action may result in informal sanction or discharge.
The alternative to withdrawal would be to bring the action to
the attention of the proper authorities, whether the SEC, the ethics
committee of the AICPA or the public prosecutor. The question also
arises whether mere resistance to individual wrongdoing is enough.
Must the auditor "blow the whistle" on the client or on the firm
after its acquiescence to client demands? David Isbell, counsel to
the AICPA, suggests that the role of the auditing firm is not to
"vouch for the rectitude of the client in any field other than the
financial one, or in that field with respect to anything other than
the financial statements which bear his report."47 Rather, he asserts
that the auditor's responsibility relates to his opinion on the financial statements. 41 If the firm owes no duty to "blow the whistle" on
the client, then under the code there would seem to be no ethical
requirement that the junior accountant report any misdeeds of the
client or partner.49 This is not to say, however, that conflict over this
point does not exist. The Securities and Exchange Commission, in
its complaint against National Student Marketing stated that the
accountants involved in that case were under a duty to demand
compliance with the securities laws from their clients, and failing
this, they were to ".

.

. withdraw from the engagement and to come

forward and notify plaintiff commission," of the violation." Of
course, some question may exist whether this duty extends to the
46.
47.

Id. at 132.
Isbell, supra note 34, at 277.

48. An accountant does have a duty to disclose material information acquired after the
issuance of an opinion on a financial statement if the subsequent knowledge convinces him
the statement is misleading. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); AICPA,
STATEMENT

ON

AuDrro PROC. No. 41(a) (1967).

49. One can reach such a requirement only by tortuous analogy. Rule 102 of the code
requires that a member shall not subordinate his judgment to that of others, and rule 501
states that a member shall not commit an act discreditable to the profession. It could be
argued that, when taken together, these two provisions require "whistle-blowing." More than
likely, however, these provisions were not designed to reach this result and are a mere command to virtue.
50. N.S.M. complaint, supra note 30, at count 2, par. 48(h) the accountant is viewed
as a central figure in the protection of the investing public.
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subordinate accountant, as asserted by the SEC, or is limited
merely to the firm as an entity. Nevertheless, the position of the
SEC is not held by the Internal Revenue Service. Treasury Department Circular 230 requires only that the accountant advise the
5
client of an error with no affirmative duty to report it to the service. 1
Likewise, several commentators have advocated the position that
the accountant need not "blow the whistle," and that he need do
no more than withdraw from the engagement. 52
Relating this controversy to the situation under scrutiny, one
can easily see that the junior accountant is faced with an overwhelmingly difficult choice if his firm refuses to support his ethical
stance. He is bound by his professional code to maintain the confidentiality of client communications while, at the same time, he
must refrain from the commission of acts violative of the law or
other code of ethics' provisions.5 3 Furthermore, he may be bound to
bring the action to the attention of the SEC or the person harmed
by the act. If, in good conscience, he discusses the propriety of the
conduct or refuses to accede to the demands and subsequently is
discharged, the duty of confidentiality may still apply, and thus
preclude any search for individual relief or professional sanctions. 4
2. Attorneys.-The attorney-client privilege, unlike that of
the accountant, is a common-law concept of early antecedent. It
was designed to allow individuals to "freely and fully confide in one
having knowledge of the law,"" without fear of disclosure by the
lawyer. This policy is expressed in the American Bar Association's
Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 4: "A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client." Because ethical consideration EC 4-2 allows the transmission of confidential client communications within the law firm, the client's confidences are not
violated when an associate learns of and discusses possible client
misdeeds.
If a lawyer obtains knowledge of client fraud, his duty to make
this information known to an aggrieved person or to a court is governed by different policies. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility the duty of the lawyer is to represent the client zealously,
51. 31 C.F.R. § 10.21 (1974).
52. CAREY, supra note 44, at 136-37; Isbell, supra note 34, at 276.
53. Rules 202 and 203 of the AICPA Code of Ethics require compliance with GAAS and
GAAP. Acts knowingly inconsistent with these standards would be unethical.
54. It may even be argued that the subordinate owes a duty of confidentiality to his

firm in matters relating to its clients.
55. See Sano Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 3 F.R.D. 467 (D.C.N.Y. 1940). As to
the accountant's privilege see text accompanying notes 43, 44-46 supra.
56.

Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960).
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within the bounds of the law. 57 The code also provides, however, that
the attorney may not "counsel or assist the client in conduct that
the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent.

58

Furthermore as

stated by Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1):
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: (1) His client has,
in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or
tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client
refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or
tribunal.5

From this it can be seen that, unlike accountants," attorneys have
a specific duty to report improper conduct on the part of the client."
If the associate is aware of client fraud or is asked to work on a
particular matter involving fraud, in a sense, the firm's client could
be considered his client and therefore the associate has a duty to
"blow the whistle. 6' 2 By analogy this duty can be expanded to cre-

57. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBMMY, CANON 7, EC 7-1 (1974).
58. Id., DR 7-102 (A)(7).
59. Id., DR 7-102(B)(1); In January, 1974, the Rule was amended adding "except when
the information is protected as a privileged communication." See also id., DR 4-101(C)(3),
as to future crimes; Lowenfels, ExpandingPublic Responsibility of Securities Lawyers: an
Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Prioritiesof Duties, 74 COLUM. L. REv.
412, 416 (1974).
60. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
61. The concept of an affirmative duty to report impending crime has been extended
recently to include a psychologist found liable for damages for the failure to warn the victim
of a death threat made by an imbalanced person under his care. Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974).
62. It should be noted that DR 7-102(B)(1) speaks only of fraud and not merely of
crimes or unethical activity. It could be argued possibly, that this limitation implies a certain
level of severity before the duty to reveal the fraud comes into existence. For example, a client
guilty of a minor campaign contribution violation may be treated differently from the corporate client who knowingly conceals material information from its shareholders. See Isbell,
supra note 34, at 277.
This argument produced several interesting comments in a recent ABA National Institute on the Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers and Accountants.
Mr. Kenneth J. Bialkin: I don't think there is much of a difference. Where the client is
about to commit any illegal act which would operate upon someone else, whether it is
larceny or any other crime, I wouldn't draw a distinction. It depends on whether the
lawyer is in a position to prevent it, and whether it is a prospective act, as opposed to a
past act. Mr. J. Gorden Cooney: ... I think that the Commission is now getting down
to the point of saying that the Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) means that if you were representing a client at one time and/or are now representing a client, and during the course
of the representation of that client, the client committed a fraud, and the fraud has been
successfully completed, then the lawyer still has an obligation to act. I think also you
have to watch out for the fact that the staff would probably take a strong position that
perhaps the present failure to disclose the past fraud is itself a fraud on the theory that
failure to correct an error may be a fraud in itself.
30 Bus. LAw. 28 (Special Iss., March 1975).
The distinction in the severity of the offense may also be relevant to the distinction
between reporting client fraud and reporting intrafirm concealment of the fraud. If the firm's
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ate a duty in the associate to report fraud on the part of a firm
member.
Thus, an associate who is commanded to commit an illegal or
unethical act or to ignore an illegal act of a client is faced with
conflicting ethical provisions. The Code of Professional Responsibility may order him both to report the client's fraud, and to retain
the client's confidences. The conflict is resolved, however, by the
limitations placed upon the attorney-client privilege, which extends
only to past crimes and not to situations involving current or continuing frauds and crimes. 3 This is certainly the position of the SEC
on the matter, as evidenced by its National Student Marketing
complaint. 4 The SEC imposes this duty because it considers critical
the attorney's role in the protection of the investing public. Likewise, in the protection of the public from unethical activities, the
attorney is the central enforcement figure and the same duty to
"blow the whistle" on unethical activity should apply.
A possible conflict with this duty arises if a duty of
confidentiality to the firm on the part of the associate exists when
the activity in question, whether that of a firm member or client, is
legal but at the same time is unethical. In these situations, neither
the law nor the Code of Ethics demands that the associate reveal
information obtained in the representation. DR4-104 states that the
confidences of the client may be revealed when necessary to prevent
a crime. Similarly DR7-102(b) states that the attorney must 'blow
the whistle" only when a fraud is perpetrated upon a person or
tribunal. These provisions seem to imply that an attorney has no
duty to report such violations and that logically, he should have the
further duty of loyalty to his firm in matters not involving violations
of law.
One additional point deserves mention. Both the AICPA Code
of Ethics and the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility provide

countenance of client fraud is viewed as less serious than the fraud itself, the associate may
escape the commands of DR 7-102(B)(1).
63. Garner v. Wolfbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1102-03 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
974 (1971); Hinds v. State Bar, 19 Cal. 2d 87, 92-93, 119 P.2d 134, 137 (1941) (attorney learned
that client would make false statements to secure a divorce).
64. N.S.M. complaint, supra note 30, at count 2, par. 48(h). From the turmoil of
Watergate has emerged a concern for the activities here discussed when they are outside the
scope of the lawyer's professional duties. The question asked was whether the attorney must
comply at all times with the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This was
answered in the affirmative in ProfessionalEthics Formal Opinion 336 (June 3, 1974), 60
A.B.A.J. 250 (1974). This opinion raises interesting questions on the propriety of an employee's recovery for discharge related to activities demanded by the employer outside the
professional duties of the employee.
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that the professional should not handle a matter that he knows he
is not competent to discharge. DR6-101(A)(2) states that an attorney shall not "handle a legal matter without preparation adequate
in the circumstances.""5 Likewise, AICPA Rule 201 provides that a
member "shall not undertake any engagement which he or his firm
cannot reasonably expect to complete with professional
competence."66 From these sections, one can postulate an ethical
violation that may occur frequently: that of the junior accountant
or associate attorney who is given an unreasonably burdensome
work load. Arguably, the superior should have reason to know (especially when informed of the problem by the associate or junior) that
a burdensome workload could result in inadequate and incompetent
representation. If so, countenance of the situation could be regarded
as a breach of ethics by the superior. Nevertheless, a discussion of
the ethics of the situation or a protest against an unreasonably large
workload could result in a discharge. 7 It must be emphasized that
in the present situation an "unreasonably burdensome workload"
does not mean the normally strenuous work undertaken by most
professionals."8 Rather, the amount of work must cause or tend to
cause harm to the client's interests. In this situation public policy
should dictate a remedy for an associate against whom reprisal is
taken for questioning the weight of his workload; otherwise he may
be impotent to protest.
III.

OTHER METHODS OF ENFORCING ETHICAL CONDUCT

The preceding discussion of statutory and professional code
provisions demonstrates the nature and limits of the duty required
65.
66.

ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmmY, DR 6-101 (A)(2) (1974).
AICPA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, 2 CCH AICPA PROF. STANDS., RULE 201

(1974).
67. A parallel to this situation can be found in the strike by legal aid attorneys in New
York (See 4 Juris Doctor No. 10, 34-44 (November, 1974)) and in the many law suits filed
against public defenders for inadequate representation. See e.g., Williams v. State, 283 So.
2d 585 (Fla. App. 1973) (failure to take an appeal); McLaughlin v. City of New York, 41
U.S.L.W. 2576 (E.D.N.Y. April 6, 1973); Gardner v. Luckey, 500 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1974)
(suits to enjoin representation or to reorganize badly overworked public defender offices). In
those cases the relief sought was different, but the problem was the same. In New York legal
aid attorneys protested that case load levels resulted in inadequate representations for indigent clients. In the public defender cases prisoners sought either release or injunctive relief
on the grounds that public defender representation was inadequate under the sixth amendment right ±o counsel.
68. This is not to say, however, that the professional's task is not difficult work and long
hours. Proficiency in the law "must come through the hard work of the lawyer himself, to
the extent that work, whether it be in attending institutes or lecture courses, in studying after
hours or in the actual day in and day out practice of his profession. . . ." Report of the
Special Committee on Specializationand Specialized Legal Education,79 ABA REP. 582, 588
(1954).
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of the subordinate professional. It is now necessary to determine
whether additional or alternative methods exist that will encourage
an atmosphere of openness and propriety in ethical matters, and
thereby facilitate ethical behavior without the need for a remedy for
an abusive discharge. Criminal penalties such as those under the
Securities Acts and the requirements of the codes of ethics are tending toward greater enforcement of ethical conduct, but other means
of enforcement may be necessary. One possibility is the unionization of professionals to protect employment rights through collective
bargaining. In this fashion, the professional employee can enjoy job
security sufficient to raise ethical issues with confidence and to
resist the solicitation to unethical activity. A second method may
be the strengthening of criminal and professional disciplinary sanctions against employers who solicit criminal or unethical conduct on
the part of employees. Both sanctions may serve to discourage the
employer's unethical conduct, but are also subject to great limitations in the creation of job security.
A.

Unionizationof Professionals

One possible method for achieving greater enforcement of professional ethics and providing job security for the subordinate professional is unionization, a movement similar to that of blue-collar
workers of the early 1900's. A common theme of the early movement
was that the employer must have "good cause" before a worker
could be discharged. Today, modern collective-bargaining agreements universally include provisions of this type and appear to protect the union worker adequately." Identical provisions in employment contracts for attorneys or accountants would achieve the same
result, but the problem remains that few professionals work under
written contracts. The informal and often oral nature of current
professional contracts probably is not conducive to a formal "discharge for cause" agreement.
Although professional associations such as the AMA, the ABA
and the AICPA have long existed, these organizations have not
addressed adequately the problems of the salaried professional.
Movements toward unionization for salaried professionals, however,
have seen significant development in recent times. The Association
69. "For cause" or "just cause" restrictions are found in 82% of the modem collective
bargaining agreements. Many of the remaining agreements list one or more specific grounds
for discharge. The most frequently listed reasons for discharge are: violation of company rules,
incompetence or failure to meet work standards, intoxication, dishonesty or theft, and insubordination. 2 BNA COLL. BARG. NEG. & CoNT. 40:1 (1971). See also CCH LAB. L. REP.

59,520 (1971).
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of Legal Aid Attorneys of the City of New York was formed almost
six years ago, and similar organizations of educators and physicians
are also in existence. 70 Although these organizations may afford
some promise for group representation, whether professionals in private practice are subject to unionization is open to question.
Professional unionization has occurred largely in the context of
government and institutional employees," where large numbers of
these professionals have banded together, wielding sufficient
strength to obtain recognition as a group force. The concern of this
note, however, is primarily with private employment, a situation
that may be inherently different from employment in government
or in a large institution. Thus, in the context of a private firm, the
number of employees will be limited and they undoubtedly will
have less "clout." Moreover, even disregarding this size differential,
the factor most prohibitive against unionization is the investment
each private professional has in his position. Although they may
have specialized grievances, lawyers and accountants have invested
years in preparation for their practice and perhaps several years in
pursuit of partnership. They are often too close in time to their goal
of independence and professional success to protest current impediments to it. As a result, employee professionals may not raise ethical
questions or may acquiesce to employer demands, 72 on the theory
that only a few years hence, they will be in the position of independence and control. Thus, as one commentator has stated: "it is no
answer to suggest that [professional employees] should seek salvation in unions-that in order to maintain their personal autonomy
in the face of [an employer], they should surrender it to the mas73
sive labor union."
B.

Criminal Sanctions Against the Employer

A second method that may be useful in encouraging the discus70. See 4 Juris Doctor No. 10, 34-44 (November, 1974). The New York association went
on strike September 10, 1974 protesting the lack of cost-of-living allowances, and the inability
to represent clients from the start to the finish of each case. The strike proved disastrous to
the young union and may have given the impression that better representation for clients was
secondary to more money for union members. Id. at 36-37.
71. Unionization of professions is strongest, perhaps, in the field of education. Teachers
have long been represented by the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers. Both organizations are currently courting the attention of university professors as is the American Association of University Professors. Id. at 38.
72. In this regard it should be noted that one primary aim of all unions is to improve
working conditions. As examined, supra, part II the overload of work on a professional employee might be regarded as a breach of ethics triggering the right to relief.
73. Blades, supra note 10, at 1414. See also, Goldstein, Some Aspects of the Nature of
Unionism Among SalariedProfessionals in Industry, 20 AM. SocIAL. REv. 199 (1955).
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sion of ethical issues and the resistance to unethical activity is the
stricter enforcement of criminal sanctions against the professional
employee's supervisor. This remedy, of course, would require the
reporting of the crime by the subordinate, and in most cases, the
mere threat of exposure will be sufficient to dissuade the criminal
activity or violation. This alternative, however, is only superficially
attractive. If an illegal act is indeed committed, either by solicitation to criminal activity or the activity itself, the superior may be
convicted, but if he is dissuaded from his action, the employee still
may be discharged without a remedy. Further, this alternative
would not be effective when the employee is discharged for merely
raising ethical issues since the employer's action would not constitute a crime.
If, however, a right of recovery is created in the discharged
professional this remedy likely will increase the effectiveness of
criminal sanctions because the employee can report criminal violations knowing he is protected against future economic hardship.
C. Professional Organizations
Another alternative to employee recovery may be in a strengthened role for existing professional organizations in monitoring conduct of their members. The availability of professional disciplinary
procedures is an important factor in maintaining high standards of
professional conduct, but when applied to the matter under consideration, they are subject to the same limitations as criminal sanctions.74 Because grievances must be signed and in writing, this form
of action falls short of effective relief. Employers learning of such
action may be likely to institute informal sanctions against the complaining employee. One possible answer to this problem, however,
may be in the establishment of advisory opinions concerning "hypothetical" situations. Under this system the employee could ascertain the correctness of his proposed conduct and act accordingly.
Although this would allow for certainty in one's choice, it would not
reduce the impact of noncompliance with the superior's orders, nor
would the necessary time delay facilitate the need for prompt action.
74.

As opposed to the lack of criminal sanctions, the discharge for the mere discussion

of ethical issues could be considered to be a breach of ethics. This theory can be justified by
EC 1-5 requiring that a lawyer maintain high standards of ethical conduct and that he
encourage fellow lawyers to do likewise. Further, the very fact that a code of ethics exists
would imply that free discussion of ethical matters is demanded.
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LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL EMPLOYMENT THEORY
UPON THE ENFORCEMENT OF ETHICS

It has been demonstrated that the traditional means of enforcing professional ethics do not make ethical conduct "as easy as
possible" for the professional employee. On one hand, criminal and
professional sanctions govern the actions he may take in the course
of his practice; they may even demand that he report violations of
other persons within his firm. On the other hand, the reporting of
criminal and ethical violations on the part of the employer ultimately could result in either informal sanctions or possibly a discharge. Additionally, the foregoing examination of existing alternatives for encouraging ethical practice indicates that they are insufficient because they fail to protect the professional employee's job
security from the risks that may ensue from raising ethical issues
or resisting unethical or illegal conduct. What is lacking is an assurance that the ethical course of action will not result in hardship for
the associate or junior accountant. The obvious course of resignation
is unsatisfactory because, as in the discharge situation, the employee is economically dislocated and may not be immediately reemployed.
Rather, the professional employee needs a "club" to give him
the "clout" that he cannot find in the current means of enforcement. A right of recovery for an "abusive discharge" would satisfactorily supplement the existing statutory and professional inducements to ethical conduct. Unfortunately, however, the prevailing
traditional legal theory does not grant job security for the subordinate professional. Because attorneys and accountants normally
have been employed under oral contracts that run for an indefinite
period of time,75 the employment continues only so long as both
parties are satisfied with the performance and the conditions. In this
long been held to be a hiring terminable
country,76 this situation has 77
"at the will" of either party. Under this characterization, payment
for a particular term 7 or denominating the employment as "perma-

nent" 9 have no effect upon the legal result." Given this approach,
75. See note 9 supra.
76. The English rule was that a hiring was presumed to be for one year's service when
no particular term was stated. 1 C. LABATr, MASTER SERvANT § 156, at 504-05 (1913).
77. Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42 N.E. 416, 417 (1895); Forrer
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967).
78. 1 A. CoRiN, CoNTRAcTs § 70, at 292-93 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
442, comment b at 339 (1958). But see Odum v. Bush, 125 Ga. 184, 53 S.E. 1013 (1906); GA.
CODE ANN. § 66-101 (1966).
79. Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 392-93, 153 N.W.2d 587, 589 (1967).
80. Several commentators have characterized the American rule as a mistaken interpre-
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no action will lie for the termination of the employment.
A.

Economic Foundationsof the "At Will" Doctrine

The reasoning underlying this doctrine can be found in the
origins of laissez-faire capitalism as it developed in the latter half
of the nineteenth century.8' The rule was well-suited to "the rustic
simplicity of the days when the farmer or small entrepreneur...
was the epitome of American individualism. ' 82 It was also suitable
to a developing industrial society in which labor was scarce. Under
such circumstances, it was to the worker's advantage to be able to
change jobs "at will" and so achieve advancement of position. Similarly, the employer could be reasonably certain that a discharged
employee would find some alternate employment.8 The combination of these economic factors, when coupled with the view that one
should not be forced to employ one whom he despises,84 led, logically, to the formulation of the employment "at will" doctrine.
A characteristic that distinguishes the professional from the
broad range of employees, however, may be found in the tradition
of apprenticeship for professional training. In the Nineteenth century the apprentice paid his employer for training and experience
in a particular trade. This contract could not be terminated "at
will" by the employer but ran for a specified time, provided the
apprentice performed his work diligently. Although professional
apprenticeships no longer exist in the twentieth century, the early
years of "professional experience" are still regarded as part of the
tation of common-law tradition. The modem rule apparently was the result of a single
scholar, H.G. Wood, who coined the Rule in his 1877 Treatise, Master and Servants. "Wood
offered no analysis to justify the assertion of this rule or his rejection of the English tradition.
He cited only four American cases as authority for his approach to general hirings, none of
which supported him." Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. Rav. 335,
341 (1974).
81. As was stated in an early Tennessee case:
May I not refuse to trade with any one? May I not forbid my family to trade with any
one? May I not dismiss my domestic servant for dealing, or even visiting, where I forbid?
And if my domestic, why not my farm-hand, or my mechanic, or teamster?... All may
dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even
for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.
Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-20 (1884), overruledon other grounds, Hutton
v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
82. Blades, supra note 10, at 1416.
83. The doctrine of mutuality of obligation dictates that if the employee has the right
to terminate the engagement "at will," so also must the employer have the same right. 9 S.
WILISTON, CoNTRACTs § 1017, at 129 n.11 (1967); J. CALAMAIU & J. PmuLLa, CoNTRACTS § 67
(1970) [hereinafter cited as CALAmAPm & PEmRIo].
84. Johnson v. Shrewsbury & Birmingham Ry., 43 Eng. Rep. 358 (Ch. 1853). See 9 S.
WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs § 1017, at 134 (1967).
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training of the employee professional-perhaps a reason why increased starting salaries are a recent phenomenon. The employee
professional may be regarded as participating in a quasiapprenticeship. In retrospect, then, the professional employee may
have retained some incidents of apprentice status, but he has lost
the job security with which it was once associated. To a certain
extent this explains the lack of precedent regarding professional
employee contracts as they are distinguished from the law of
master-servant as applied to other employment relationships.
B.

The Legal Foundationsof the "At Will" Doctrine

The "at will" Doctrine in legal theory was justified on the
ground that the employment contract was really an offer to a unilateral contract by the employer, to be accepted by the employee
through the performance of the specified services. 5 Under this
theory, the employee could cease work at any time and thus not
accept further offers; the employer being bound to pay only for
services rendered and not for future services.8
The right of an employer to terminate "at will" reached constitutional proportions with respect to state statutes that attempted
to protect union activity. In two cases, Adair v. United States7 and
Coppage v. Kansas88 the United States Supreme Court held that
laws interfering with the "right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe
the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person
offering to sell it, . . ." were violative of due process. 9 In striking
down these anti-yellow-dog statutes the Court held that both the
fifth and the fourteenth amendments required that it is "the right
of the employee to quit the service of the employer, for whatever
reason [and that it] is the same . . .right of the employer, for
whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such employee." 0
Eventually, the forces of organized labor were successful in
combating the laissez-faire expressions of the Adair and Coppage
courts.' Workers were protected in their efforts to unionize and,
85. "In a good many such cases, it has been held that the employee has made no
promise of any kind; he accepts the offer by merely continuing to render the specified service,
and becomes entitled to the promised salary in proportion to the work actually done." 1 A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 70, at 292-93 (1963).
86. Id. at 293.
87. 208 U.S. 161 (1928).
88. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
89. 208 U.S. 161, 174 (1908).
90. Id. at 174-75.
91. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National
Labor Relations Act and its authorization of free unionism).
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once recognized, found a powerful tool in the right of collective
bargaining.9 2 Currently, nearly all negotiated contracts provide that
discharge must be for cause and thus minimize the potential for
abusive discharges. Nonetheless, despite union advancement, workers not protected by union contracts are still subject to discharge "at
will." This anomaly has resulted in spite of the Supreme Court's
criticism of employers' use of "discharge as a means of intimidation
and coercion. 9 3 As suggested by Dean Lawrence Blades:
the demise of Adair and Coppage demonstrates that from the standpoint of
sound policy and thus as a matter of constitutional principle, the traditional
rule can no longer be justified. The industrial revolution made an anachronism
of the absolute right of discharge by destroying the classical ideal of complete
freedom of contract upon which it is based.'

If, as suggested, the traditional rule of employment "at will"
cannot be justified in circumstances amounting to a discharge without cause or in the situation of an "abusive discharge," what movements have occurred to mitigate its operation? The traditional rule
has found few defenders among modern commentators 5 and many
alternate theories have been advanced. It has been suggested that
the employee's promise to perform services for an unspecified period
is sufficient consideration to support an implied promise of discharge only for cause or creating an option to remain as long as the
services are needed and satisfactory." The courts, however, have
been conservative in their evaluation of the consideration theory
and have held that the employer's consideration is the wages alone
and that no further consideration is generated by the employee to
support a promise of permanent employment. 7
92. As to the unionization of professionals see part M supra.
93. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937).
94. Blades, supra note 10, at 1418. See also Dawson, Economic Duress and FairExchange in French and German Law, 11 TmL. L. Rav. 345 (1937).
95. See Blumrosen, Settlement of Disputes Concerning the Exercise of Employer Disciplinary Power, United States Report, 18 RuTGERs L. Rv.428, 432 (1964); Blades, supra note
10, at 1428-30; Note, Implied Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv.335 (1974); Comment,
43 FORDHAM L. REV. 300 (1974). A number of recent cases, however, have applied the traditional rule, often without questioning its foundation in policy. Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp.
501 (W.D.N.C. 1973); Lorson v. Falcon Coach, Inc., 522 P.2d 449, 214 Kan. 670 (1974); Senac
v. L.M. Berry Co., 299 So.2d 433 (La. App. 1974); Cactus Feeders, Inc. v. Witier, 509 S.W.2d
934 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
96. Cf. Blades, supra note 10, at 1420-21; Comment, 43 FoRDHAm L. REv. 300, 305
(1974). See 1 A. Comm, CoNTRACTs § 49, at 187 (1963). See also Harrison v. Jack Eckerd
Corp., 342 F. Supp. 348 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972) (plaintiff unsuccessfully urged that stock option was partially accepted by accepting employment, thus making
the option irrevocable).
97. See Note, Employment Contracts of UnspecifiedDuration, 42 COLUm. L. REv. 107,
121 (1942); Blades supra note 10, at 1420.
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This position appears unsound when applied to the employee
professional. The added responsibilities of the professional may indeed justify an implied promise of employment as long as the services are satisfactory. The professional is subject to many requirements over and above those of the ordinary employee, including
regulation by state licensing boards and the imposition of a code of
professional ethics. Further, the employee is bound to a duty of
confidentiality to the employer as well as the client and perhaps a
duty to develop his professional skills. Finally, the attorney or accountant, though an employee, may have a responsibility to complete the adequate representation of a client. 8 He cannot simply
cease his work on a project at the risk of jeopardizing the client's
interests. Perhaps these additional factors would justify an implied
term in the professional employment contract requiring that discharge must be for cause. If so, the discharged employee would have
a remedy under contract theory without resort to principles of tort.
This result is attractive because it recognizes the elevated public
duty inherent in the status of the professional, and provides the quid
pro quo of this responsibility in the form of an implied promise of
permanent employment so long as the services are needed and are
professionally competent.
Other than the traditional analysis of consideration, recourse to
protection through the concepts of adhesion contracts99 and the doctrine of unconscionability has occurred.100 Contracts of adhesion involve an overreaching of one of the parties, in this case the employee. Social policy justifies this alternative because in the modern
industrial society-especially with the current job market for attorneys'"l-the employee seldom can demand or even negotiate terms
of employment.' 2 Given this inequality of bargaining power brought
98. Under EC 2-31 & -32 lawyers who undertake representation must complete the work
involved. Further, under DR 2-110(A)(1)-(2) permission is required from the tribunal before
he may withdraw and the attorney must take proper steps to avoid prejudice to the client.
99. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir. 1948); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
100. The Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302 provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
See generally, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
101. It is estimated that currently there are 400,000 lawyers in the United States with
only 19,000 new jobs opening up every year, while law school enrollment is 106,000 persons.
A Surfeit of Lawyers, 84 Newsweek, Dec. 9, 1974, at 74 (quoting Dep't of Labor statistics).
102. This, of course, does not mean that the professional does not know the terms of
his employment contract. Rather, it refers to his ability to vary those terms. The traditional

1975]

PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEE REMEDY

about by market conditions, 0 resort to the concept of adhesion may
ameliorate the harsh results of the freedom of contract. As Dean
Blades illustrates, however, the doctrine normally is used to invalidate existing contractual terms and not to create new implied obliapplied
gations.'"4 Similarly, the doctrine of unconscionability has
10 5 In most
contracts.
employment
to
in the main to sales and not
cases it has been further limited to consumers, 10 and courts have
not been responsive to claims of unconscionability when brought by
businessmen and middle-class cash purchasers. 0 7 Therefore, these
contractual remedies do not afford immediate potential for relief,
because in the absence of "for cause" provisions, the courts have
steadfastly refused recovery based on principles of adhesion and
unconscionability.
Three important cases, however, have allowed recovery for
"abusive discharges." In Petermannv. Teamsters Local 396,108 the
employee was fired for failing to commit perjury when solicited to
do so by his employer.' The court held that the employee had a
cause of action for damages against the employer, and stated that
"[tihe public policy of this state requires that every impediment,
however remote to the . . . objective [of truthful testimony] must
be struck down when encountered" and that the employee's discharge was thus a breach of the employment contract." A second
case, Framptonv. CentralIndianaGas Co.,"' concerned a discharge
for the filing of a workman's compensation claim. The court found
that it was a crime to prevent the filing of these claims and that
because of this strong public policy, the employee had a private
right of action for damages. Finally, the court in Monge v. Beebe
theory, however, has been that "[t]he servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment
on the terms which are offered him." McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E.
517, 518 (1892) (Holmes, J.).
103. It should be noted that it is these same market conditions that exacerbate the
critical concern of this note-the fact that the subordinate professional compromises his
ethical principles out of fear of economic dislocation and the dread of seeking alternative
employment in a glutted field.
104. Blades, supra note 10, at 1421. The author also indicates that the implied promises, if any, would still lack consideration to support them.
105. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-102: "this article applies to transactions in
goods." But see Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Umberto, 7 Ucc REP. SERV. 1181 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970).
106. See, e.g., H. BLACK, Buy Now PAY LATER (1967); D. CAPLOVrrZ, THE POOR PAY MORE
(1969).
107. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 114-15 (1972).
108. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (2d Dist. 1959).
109. Id. at 189, 344 P.2d at 28.
110. Id. at 189, 344 P.2d at 27. For a detailed examination of this case see Comment,
43 FORDHAM L. REV. 300, 306-07 (1974).
111. 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973). But see Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d
(no private cause of action created in discharged employee).
(1956)
122
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Rubber Co.,112 invalidated a discharge based on an employee's refusal to "go out" with the defendant's foreman."' This 1974 case
held that a discharge under an employment contract terminable "at
will" could not be motivated by retaliation, malice, or bad faith."'
Monge, however, did not involve a strong legislatively expressed
public policy that would conflict with the motivation of the discharge."5 Rather, the court appeared to hold that contemporary
conditions demanded a change from the traditional rule."' In this
the court may have expressed a new public policy-the public interest demands that the employee fired in bad faith be permitted to
recoup his loss through the judicial system.
In each of the three cases granting recovery to the discharged
employee, the court appeared to struggle with the characterization
of the right of action. Petermannand Monge were held to sound in
contract, while Framptonwas totally unclear." 7 Logically, it would
appear that theories of the tort liability could govern the recovery
for an "abusive discharge.""' Several parallels to such an action
exist, including actions for abuse of process,"' actions for thirdparty interference with an employment relationship 2 ' and numerous statutory causes of action.2 ' Tort recovery is preferable because
it avoids the unyielding requirement of consideration essential to a
contract action. 2 2 At issue is the harm done to the employee and the
breach of duty owed by the employer. The problem, of course, is in
112. 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
113. Id. at 552.
114. Id. at 551.
115. An apt analogy to the retaliatory discharge is the retaliatory action involved in
some landlord-tenant cases. In many cases tenants have recovered for eviction motivated by
the tenants' actions in contacting housing authorities. Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp.,
463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (D.C. Code prohibited retaliatory evictions).
116. Two excellent analyses of the Monge decision are found in Comment, 43 FoRDHAM
L. REv. 300 (1974), and Comment, 8 GA. L. REv. 996 (1974).
117. In all probability, the characterization was the result of the parties in their choice
of pleadings. The courts were perhaps strained in compartmentalizing the theory of the cases,
but at the same time felt bound to grant relief.
118. Blades, supra note 10,-at 1422-27.
119. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 121, at 856 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].
120. PROSSER, supra note 119, § 129, at 932-33. See, e.g., United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Millonas, 206 Ala. 147, 89 So. 732 (1921) (employee discharged because employer's insurer threatened cancellation of policy if employee filed compensation claim).
121. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1102, 1105 (West 1971). See also Note, California'sControls on
Employer Abuse of Employee PoliticalRights, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1015 (1970). Several federal
statutory provisions exist prohibiting various forms of employer abuse or discrimination.
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3) (1970); Title VII, Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Supp. II, 1972); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970).
122. The cases sounding in contract did not discuss the need for consideration.
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establishing the duty because, in dealing with the traditonal rule,
one is confronted with a century of action where the employer has
had the absolute right of discharge regardless of the motive.
The problem of creating job security for the professional employee may be solved under the holding of these recent cases by
further reliance on the concept of public policy. Certainly the state
has a strongly expressed public policy in favor of encouraging ethical
conduct. The states license professionals, their statutes prohibit
criminal activities, and the states' highest court often regulate the
bar. Together, these interests form an overwhelming public policy
supporting the actions of the resisting professional employee. If
courts have allowed recovery based on the public policy considerations present in perjury solicitation and intimidation against compensation claims, recovery also should be given for a discharge resulting from refusing solicitation to unethical and criminal activity
or the mere questioning of the propriety of contemplated actions.
V.

CREATION OF THE REMEDY

This note has demonstrated that under the traditional "employment at will" doctrine an employee has no remedy for an "abusive discharge." This section is an attempt to create such a remedy
for the professional employee, either as a continuance of the recent
common-law trend of cases such as Frampton, Petermann, and
Monge or as a proposal for legislative adoption.
PROPOSAL:

No professional employee shall be discharged primarily for raising and discussing ethical issues regarding his employment.

PROPOSAL:

No professional employee shall be discharged primarily for the refusal to obey the order of a superior
or employer when this refusal was the only feasible
means to prevent either a violation of a criminal
statute or a breach of his professional ethics.

The above statements embody the proposed cause of action for
the discharged professional employee. Several points, however,
must be discussed regarding the limits of this right. First, it must
be determined whether a total discharge should be necessary to
bring the right into existence or whether informal pressure brought
to bear by the employer should be sufficient. Secondly, some procedure must be provided for exhausting all informal remedies prior to
discharge. Thirdly, difficult questions exist concerning matters of
proof and the employee's ability to marshall the facts. Fourthly, an
examination of the potential recovery must be made and whether
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compensatory or punitive damages will be allowed. Finally, the
source of the right to recovery will be examined. This will involve
consideration of possible common-law and statutory rights and the
possibility of administrative agency supervision.
A.

Degree of Employer Sanction

Because this note is concerned with both the prevention of
unethical conduct and the necessity of job security for the professional employee, it is necessary to examine the degree to which one
may be disciplined before any right of action should arise against
the employer. Certainly, a complete discharge will suffice because
it represents the ultimate in the employee's economic dislocation.
A discharge necessarily requires the employee to search for new
employment and at the same time forces him to justify his reasons
for leaving his prior position when negotiating with prospective
3
employers.1
The firm, however, may resort to informal moves against a
recalcitrant associate or junior accountant. Such moves could be the
result of the merely raising of possible improprieties or resisting a
superior's orders. These sanctions could involve a denial of promotion, a salary freeze, a less desirable work assignment, or an unfavorable reference to a future employer. Although these tactics are burdensome to the employee, they should not result in the triggering
of a right of recovery against the employer. Informal sanctions do
not involve the economic hardships present in the discharge situation. The associate or junior accountant is still employed and may
discreetly seek employment elsewhere.' 24 This presents the most
workable solution to the problem because, ideally, it is undesirable
to be employed by a firm that disallows discussion of ethical issues
or demands unethical conduct from its employees. On the other
hand, wages are still being earned, allowing a continuance of family
support.
It can easily be seen, however, that once created, a right of
recovery in the employee could be circumvented by the employing
firm.'The firm need only make the employment so difficult and
unpleasant that the employee would quit in frustration. Upon an
action for damages, the firm would simply counter with the defense
that the employee resigned voluntarily. 11 Therefore, in order to
counteract this tactic, recovery should be allowed when the em123.
124.
125.
the court

See note 101 supra.
See Blades, supra note 10, at 1406.
This was argued in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974), but
found a discharge.
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ployer engages in actions or imposes job requirements that are so
unreasonable that they justify the employee's resignation. Although
this standard is necessarily subjective, theoretically, it is no more
so than the standard for ordinary negligence and it may be made
more specific by subsequent judicial interpretation. Hopefully, this
requirement would minimize employer harassment, yet would not
afford recovery in a situation in which the employee's resignation is
due only to minor conflicts.
B.

Informal Remedies

By far the greatest number of intra-firm ethical conflicts are
resolved informally. The obvious desideratum is that upon the senior partner's approach, the associate or junior accountant will voice
his objections to the course of action, and through informal discussion, the ethical course will be taken. 2 ' If no understanding is
reached, 2 the desirable practice would be to discuss the action with
other members of the firm. Often the subject actually is28 brought
before a meeting of the partnership or of the entire firm.1
If the problem is elevated to one of confrontation, two things
should be noted. First, the employee would be wise to seek guidance
and support for his position from members of the local professional
association and perhaps from the local grievance committee. Some
local associations maintain telephone advisory services that allow a
2
quick resolution of doubts as to the propriety of certain actions.' '
Secondly, the associate should be prepared to suffer the conse126. In a law office "[m]uch can be accomplished if an older lawyer in the office is
willing to serve as a preceptor for a young lawyer and to take the time to talk over with him
the problems that he will face during his professional life." T. VOORHEES, THE PRACTICAL
LAWYER'S MANUAL FOR LAW OFFICE TRAINING FOR ASSOCIATES 40 (1969); see also Burke,
Conflicts of Interest, in MANAGING LAW OFFICE 229 (PLI ed. 1965).

127. In many cases the probable result is an education of one of the parties to the nature
of the transaction. Either the associate will point out the ethical problem to the partner, or,
in reverse, the partner will demonstrate the correctness of the course of action.
128. Mr. Robert B. von Mehren, a partner in the firm of Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons
& Gates, has stated:
Law firms must recognize the ethical problem when it arises. That is a question of
sensitivity and discussion among the lawyers. In our office, if someone runs into a
problem of professional ethics he will discuss the question with one or more partners. If
the matter is something which raises considerable doubt in the view of the partners who
consider it, it will be discussed at the firm's weekly luncheon. There the issue will be
resolved in accord with the judgment of all of the partners.
von Mehren, Ethics, in MANAGING LAW OFFICES 234 (PLI ed. 1965). In the author's discussions
with members of firms in Nashville, Atlanta and San Francisco, the above procedure was
most often used.
129. New York City has such a service whereby grievances are telephoned to a committee on ethics. Id. at 233.
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quences if his position subsequently is found to be erroneous. Again,
this is not to suggest that a firm should be allowed to dishcarge an
employee merely because he questioned the propriety of a certain
action although stopping short of actual insubordination. In fact,
the near universal practice is to encourage open discussion of ethical
problems. But when this practice is not the norm, discharge for
merely raising ethical concerns should give rise to a cause of action
in the discharged employee.
Thus, although a remedy should be given for a discharge that
is the result of resistance or even mere questioning of improprieties,
it should not be allowed when discharge results from the refusal to
follow superior orders when the employee's position was incorrect.
To hold otherwise would be to elevate individual ideas to a position
of primacy,'30 if not to reward erroneous judgment.
C. Problems of Proof
Closely aligned with the pursuit of informal remedies is the
problem of proof of the employer's actions. By its very nature, solicitation to unethical activity will be covert at best. The typical situation will not involve readily provable facts and could evolve into a
swearing contest between the parties. Moreover, once a right of
recovery is established, the danger of fictitious claims arises, a possibility that should be eliminated by a sufficiently stringent standard of proof.
A prerequisite to any recovery by the discharged employee
should be that all internal avenues of conflict resolution 3 , be exhausted and that the conflict be brought to the attention of the local
grievance committee. This requirement serves a dual purpose since
it not only encourages a settlement of the controversy before any
damaging acts are done but also forms a record of actions taken that
130.

Under many theories of civil disobedience (Thoreau-Ghandi-King) there is no

expected relief from punishment. Likewise, in the instant situation, the employee's resistance
is grounded in conscious resistance. The difference, however, is that the professional employee
asserts this position as the systematic norm and only later is he proved incorrect. See
generally Levinson, Civil Disobedienceand the Need for a ProportionedResponse, 20 U. FLA.
L. REv. 278, 279 (1968). The author believes that departure from the firm is the only practical

alternative when there is a denial of the employee's request not to work on matters distasteful
to him which are short of being unethical.

131. A similar requirement exists for judicial review of administrative agency action.
"[N]o one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed
administrative remedy has been exhausted." Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303
U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938); Cf. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT §§ 20.01-.10 (3d ed. 1972); the

A.N.A. NuRSEs CODE, supra note 3, states that there should be ". . . an established mechanism for the reporting and handling of incompetent, unethical or illegal practice within the
employment setting, so that such reporting can go through official channels and be done
without fear of reprisal." Id. at 471.
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can be used by the employee as proof. Because this type of
solicitation to unethical activity normally will be covert, letters of
protest, witnesses to discussions, minutes of partnership meetings,
and grievance committee petitions all will be available to document
the employee's resistance to unethical activity. He still must prove
that his resistance was the "primary" motive for the discharge, but
an exhaustion requirement would aid the employee's marshalling of
the evidence.'32
It should be noted that many accounting and law firms do not
have formal procedures for resolving ethical questions that may
arise in the course of practice. If a right to recovery is granted,
however, it may serve as an inducement to less formality and make
the plaintiff's case more difficult to prove. This problem might be
solved in two ways. First, any remedy granted by statute could
require the adoption of formal or semi-formal grievance procedures
within law and accounting firms. Secondly, similar procedures
could be required by state professional associations or by the respective codes of ethics. If these provisions were adopted, the absence
of satisfactory procedures could result in a shifting of the burden of
proof to the employer to prove that the discharge was not motivated
33
primarily by the employee's response to the ethical problem.1
When informal grievance procedures are available and have
been exhausted, the employee logically should have the burden of
proof on the issue of the reason for the discharge.13 1 Some question
exists, however, concerning the proper quantum of evidence needed
to sustain a recovery. Under the traditional civil standard the plaintiff must prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 This
132. As noted infra, where an administrative agency to handle cases of professional
discharges exists, of necessity there must be resort to administrative action before the grant
of judicial relief.
133. An interesting example of this type of affirmative requirement can be found in an
SEC consent order involving law firm regulation. The Commission enjoined the firm's illegal
activity and required a process for assuring compliance with the order. Among the requirements were: that the firm meet every two weeks to discuss the firm's active cases and obtain
approval of all partners before any opinions are issued; that the firm investigate bond offerings to assure use of independent auditors and to check the background of participants; and
that partners and associates, at least annually, attend continuing education workshops and
seminars. In re Ferguson, Securities Act Release No. 5523 (Aug. 21, 1974); 5 SEC DOCKET No.
2, at 37-38 (Sept. 3, 1974), BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 268, at A-25 (Sept. 11, 1974). This
type of action is a new approach in using leverage against professionals to cure ills not solely
in the securities markets. See Fiflis, supra note 6, at 64, n.125.
134. But cf. the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. § 459 (App. 1970)
(burden of proof on employer).
135. See C. McCoRMICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 339 (2d ed., E. Clearly 1972)
[hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK]; 9 J. WIGMORE, TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 2498 and cases
cited at 325 n.1 (1940).
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standard has been defined as "proof which leads the jury to find
that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its
nonexistence. ' ' 36 This standard appears appropriate in the instant
situation because it forces the plaintiff to demonstrate, as a factual
matter, that his resistance was the "primary" motive in bringing
about the discharge. Thus, when both sides present equally persuasive cases, the plaintiff will have failed to satisfy his burden under
this standard.
An alternative to the "preponderance test" is the "clear and
convincing evidence" test.' 7 Under this test the plaintiff has the
greater burden of showing a "high probability" of the existence of
his factual assertions.1 3 This standard is used most often in actions
in which the facts are known only to the parties, such as cases
involving fraud or undue influence in the making of a will.'39 The
use of this standard is tempting in the instant case because of the
covert nature of the solicitation. Further, a higher standard of proof
would tend also to minimize recovery in vexatious suits in which the
jury's sympathies may lie with the employee. A countervailing factor, however, is the requirement that the informal remedies be exhausted prior to any judicial action. Of necessity, the pursuit of an
informal remedy will acquaint third parties with the controversy
and thus bring the facts outside the exclusive knowledge of the
parties.
Once the standard of proof is determined, an examination must
be made of the inferences appropriate for use in establishing the
requirement that the discharge be "primarily" the result of the
employee's resistance. Parallel examples may be found in actions
before the National Labor Relations Board under the National
Labor Relations Act provisions forbidding discharge on grounds of
union activity or membership.14 Assuming that an employer attempts to justify discharge on grounds other than employee resistance to unethical action, the employee may prove his case in several
ways: the contemporaneous nature of the resistance and the firing, 4,
recent promotion or commendation of the employee,1 2 lesser sanc136. MCCORMICK, supra note 135, at § 339, at 794; see also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
rule 1(3) (1942).
137. MCCORMICK, supra note 135, at § 340.
138. See id. at 796.
139. Id. at 797.
140. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). See Note, California'sControls of Employer Abuses
of Employee PoliticalRights, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1015, 1044 (1970).
141. Cf. NLRB v. Council Mfg. Corp., 334 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Tru-line
Metal Prods. Co., 324 F.2d 614 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 906 (1964).
142. Cf. NLRB v. Council Mfg. Corp., 334 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1964).
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tions given to other employees for the same stated reasons,4 3 or a
long and uneventful term of employment already served.'44 When
combined with third-party testimony concerning the conflict, these
factors will aid the employee in establishing the reasons for the
discharge. Thus the associate's burden does not seem insurmountable; the key factor will be the documentation of employer action.
D. Damages
If the plaintiff prevails, he should be compensated for the damages to his professional reputation,'4 5 economic losses suffered as a
result of the lost employment,' and perhaps attorney's fees and
costs.'47 Essentially, these are compensatory damages and could be
awarded either under a common-law action or by statutory enactment. Compensatory damages have been defined as substitutionary, that is, giving the plaintiff relief to make up for a loss not
originally a money loss, but one that ordinarily may be measured
in money.4 Additionally, some possibility of nonpecuniary compensatory damages may be desirable. This could involve a public declaration of moral standing or perhaps the entry of a corrective notice
in the official professional organ.
Problems do exist, however, in determining the method of measuring compensatory damages. If recovery is measured by the period
from discharge to the trial,' the plaintiff might be encouraged
merely to await recovery. This situation is not likely to occur, however, because few, if any, plaintiffs could afford not to seek alternate
employment. Additionally, a duty to mitigate damages should be
imposed by requiring the employee to seek satisfactory employment
143. Cf. Colecraft Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 385 F.2d 998, 1004 (2d Cir. 1967).
144. Cf. Sterling Aluminum Co. v. NLRB, 391 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1968); Mims v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 940 (1953) (libel
action for stated reason of discharge when employee had served 32 years).
145. Rarely are special damages awarded for damage to the employee's reputation.
They are ordinarily said to be too remote and not in the contemplation of the parties.
Mastoras v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 217 F. 153 (D.C. Cir. 1914); Gary v. Central of Ga.
Ry., 37 Ga. 744, 141 S.E. 819 (1928). In the instant case, however, the primary asset of the
professional is his reputation. Discharge by the employer certainly contemplates the resultant
damage to one's reputation.
146. Recovery for back pay has been allowed for wrongful discrimination in hiring and
discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(9), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e11 (1970), as amended, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103 (codified
at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2000e-i (1970); Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D.
Mich. 1973).
147. Accord, Comment, 8 GA. L. REv. 996, 1006 (1974).
148. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DOBBS].
149. See Comment, Monetary Recovery Under FederalStatutes, 45 TEx. L. REv. 853
(1967).
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elsewhere, although the510plaintiff would not be bound to accept a
different or inferior job.
An additional possibility for recovery would be the granting of
punitive damages. 5 1 This alternative is attractive because a major
purpose of a punitive damage award is to deter the tortfeasor's
actions. 52 Since the major function of the present cause of action is
to create an atmosphere that deters unethical conduct, punitive
damages are particularly appropriate.'53 Traditionally, these damages have been awarded when the defendant's conduct is intentional, deliberate, and of a character "frequently associated with
crime." 5 1 Conduct proscribed by the proposed remedy certainly will
be intentional and it can be argued persuasively that the intentional
solicitation to criminal or unethical activity satisfies any requirement of outrageous activity. 51 5 Nevertheless, if punitive damages are
allowed, grave potential for abuse exists. Disgruntled employees,
faced with a legitimate discharge, may resort to a type of coercion
using the threat of punitive damages to insure continued employment. This problem should be solved by requiring the plaintiff to
prove that discharge resulted "primarily" from the employee's raising of ethical issues which would thus allow the employer to terminate the employment relationship when good cause exists.
A further aspect of punitive damages is that they are often a
veiled award for attorney's fees and expenses encountered in bringing suit.' 0 This appears to be a laudable purpose, although if a right
150. The employee need not seek or accept a position of lesser rank, State ex rel.
Freeman v. Sierra Co. Bd. of Ed., 49 N.M. 54, 157 P.2d 234 (1945); Mitchell v. Lewensohn,
251 Wis. 424, 29 N.W.2d 748 (1947), at a reduced salary, Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales
Corp., 105 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aft'd, 305 N.Y. 48, 110 N.E.2d 551 (1953), or at a
distant place, San Antonio & A.P. Ry. v. Collins, 61 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). See
generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 83, at § 219 (1970).
151. Punitive damages have been allowed in suits under Title VII, Stamps v. Detroit
Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973). But see Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368
F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1973), and in civil rights contexts under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 1983 (1970).
See Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F.
Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
152. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1896); PROSSER, supra note 119, at § 2, at 9.
153. Punitive damages also may serve a useful purpose in those jurisdictions in which
compensatory damages are not allowed for damage to reputation. See note 145 supra.
154. PROSSER, supra note 119, § 2, at 9.
155. "It is usually the defendant's mental state that is said to justify a punitive award
against him, rather than his outward conduct." DOBBS, supra note 148, at § 3.9, at 205; see
Taylor v. Atchison, T & S.F. Ry., 92 F. Supp. 968 (D. Mo. 1950) (punitive damages allowed
where employee fired in violation of contract). Although punitive damages normally are not
allowed in an action on a contract, the instant remedy should be characterized as one in tort
for wrongful discharge. CALAMARI & PARmLO, supra note 83, at § 205.
156. PROSSER, supra note 119, at § 2, at 11.
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to recovery were granted statutorily, such expenses could be
awarded without punitive damages.
E.

Reinstatement

Although reinstatement may be offered as a possible remedy for
the discharged professional, it is not the optimum solution because
of its potentially self-defeating nature. Litigation between the parties to the action is likely to cause anger and hostility, an atmosphere not conducive to good working relationships. Further, forcing
the employer to reinstate a discharged associate or junior accountant often will mean simply that the employer will search for other
causes for discharge.1 7 These reasons might include fabricated
charges of insubordination or unsatisfactory performance of an unreasonably burdensome workload.
Most importantly, perhaps, the private employer should have
the absolute power to discharge an employee, particularly in the
professional fields. In the operation of the modern law or accounting
firm, firm members interact constantly, and this interaction would
be impaired seriously by a requirement that the employee be reinstated. Thus, even though the employer should not have the right
to discharge, because contract or tort theory will provide a recovery
for the employee, the employer should still have the power to do so.
As under any contract, it should be a matter of the employer's
choice. The price of the power to breach the contract is the damage
incurred by the other party. Indeed, it is hoped that compensatory
and punitive damages may be sufficiently burdensome to dissuade
unethical conduct from the beginning.
F.

The Source of the Remedy

A final, but critical topic of concern is the source and method
of enforcement of any right of recovery for an "abusive discharge."
At issue is whether the right is to be found under federal or state
constitutional provisions, federal or state statutory provisions,
common-law actions, or through the establishment of an administrative agency.
It has been suggested that the acts of private individuals might
be regulated legitimately under the federal constitution as if these
same acts were done by an arm of the government. 158 This theory is
157. See Note, Improving the Effectiveness of NLRB Remedies in DiscriminatoryDischarge Cases, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1169 (1968); Note, California'sControls on Employer
Abuse of Employee PoliticalRights, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1015, 1048 (1970).

158. Cf. Note, State Action: Theories for Applying ConstitutionalRestrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 656 (1974). See also Blades, supra note 10, at 1431 & 1431
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advanced on the basis that certain large private entities serve a
quasi-governmental function and thus satisfy the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment. 5 While some large corporations may, arguably, approach this status because of their pervasive effects upon an individual's life, even a large accounting or law
firm would not fit within this categorization.' 60 Thus, it appears
improbable and perhaps visionary that the Federal Constitution
will provide the direct source of any private cause of action on the
part of an abusively discharged professional employee.' 6'
A better hope for a constitutionally based cause of action lies
in the emerging importance of state constitutions. Although most
state constitutions contain state action requirements,' in many
cases the language is ambiguous and unlitigated.113 Additionally,
some state constitutions require state action for some provisions but
not for others.' 6' In those states where state action is not required
for certain provisions, some cases have held that a private right of
action is created directly by the state constitution.'65 It is conceivable that the proposed cause of action could be created under certain
"right to work" provisions166 or, in the alternative, under state "due
process" provisions, but the creation of a recovery for the discharged
professional admittedly would necessitate a strained construction of
even the most liberal state constitutions. State constitutional intern.127; A.S. MILLER, PIvATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE CONSTITUTIONS 13 (Occasional Paper for
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1959) cited in Blades at 1431 n.127.
159. The state action requirement was first enunciated in the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883). The quasi-governmental authority concept was extended in Food Employees
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) and subsequently limited in Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). As to the creation of a private right of action under a
federal constitutional amendment, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971) (cause of action created under the fourth amendment).
160. Constitutional regulation of private action has been criticized strongly by some
commentators. See, e.g., Wellington, The Constitution,the Labor Union, and "Governmental
Action," 70 YALE L.J. 345 (1961).
161. Procedural due process upon discharge is also limited even in instances involving
state action. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See
generally E. REUTHER & R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 455-57 (1970).
162. Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 Hnav. Cw.
RIGHTS-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 271, 277-301 (1973).
163. Id.
164. FLA. CONST. art. I § 6 (right to work and collectively bargain); FLA. CONST. art. I §
9 (due process); ILL. CONST. art. I § 17 (prohibiting discrimination in hiring and promotion
practices without regard to state action); N.J. CONST. art. I § 19 (constitutional right to work
and collectively bargain).
165. Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing Co., 36 N.J. 189, 175 A.2d 639 (1961) (action created
under N.J. CONST. art. I § 19 to enforce right to collectively bargain); Local 519 Plumbers &
Pipefitters v. Robertson, 44 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1950) (action to enforce rights guaranteed under
FLA. CONST., Decl. of Rts. § 6 (1885) (now FLA. CONST., Decl. of Rts. § 12-right to work).
166. Id.
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pretation, however, would be further support for the existence of
such a right whether subsequently created by statute or developed
from the common law.
Perhaps the easiest method for creating a right of recovery
would be through a federal or state statute. The statute could take
the form of the proposals described above and could provide both
the standard of proof and the nature of damages. Of necessity, the
statute must satisfy federal" 7 or state'68 jurisdictional grounds, but,
given the extent of regulation in other areas,'69 this does not appear
problematic.
Although the modern law or accounting firm is involved with
and affects interstate commerce to a degree sufficient, in all probability, to justify federal involvement, it is likely that the problem
under consideration is more suited to state regulation. Federal legislation might be difficult to obtain, and because professionals are
organized, licensed, and regulated on a state by state basis, statecreated remedies seem preferable.
As an exercise of the police power, a state could create a right
of recovery for the wrongfully discharged professional employee.'70
This alternative appears to afford the best opportunity for acceptance and as under a federal statute, proof could be prescribed and
damages specifically stated. Given the increased public awareness
of ethical problems and the greater push towards ethical training for
young professionals, state statutory solutions may be within the
realm of possibility. Certain obstacles, however, may exist. Paradoxically, some resistance to a state statute may come from state
professional organizations. While the statute could boost their
public image, members of the organizations might not view the
remedy as in their best interests because such legislation offers the
potential for recovery against themselves and their firms.
A recovery under common-law principles of master-servant law
or tort law could be accomplished without too great a break with
167. Federal legislation not keyed to state action and the fourteenth amendment is
normally upheld under the Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8.
168. Although many state constitutions require state action under specific provisions,
they do not operate as limitations on the legislative power. This is justified under the state's
inherent "police powers." See State Bills of Rights, 8 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 271,
298 (1973).
169. Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S.,
379 U.S. 241 (1964) (racial discrimination); Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000(e)-(e)(2) (1970) (employment discrimination); Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970).
170. An analogous remedy has been enacted in California prohibiting discharge for an
employee's political activities. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1102 (West 1974 Supp.).
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traditional theory.'7' The traditional theory was and still is that "at
will" contracts may be terminated for any reason. As noted previously, however, recovery has been granted recently in situations
involving nonwork-related discharges.'7 2 In these cases, recovery was
based on the fact that a strong public policy existed in favor of the
employee's actions. It is difficult to imagine a stronger public policy
than that of regulating professional occupations and preserving ethical conduct. To illustrate: each state licenses attorneys, accountants and other professionals contingent on the provision of ethical
conduct, and its statutes prohibit criminal activities. Together,
these interests form an overwhelming public policy supporting the
actions of a resisting employee. Thus, whether the cause of action
is created in tort or in contract, courts should protect their own
interests in preserving ethical conduct.
A final alternative for compensating the wrongfully discharged
employee lies in resort to an administrative agency for resolution of
the claim.'7 3 To this end, a new agency could be created to deal
specifically with this problem, or an existing agency's jurisdiction
could be expanded. Again, it would be preferable to vest this power
in a state agency, because existing state agencies such as a state fair
employment commission may already have the necessary expertise
in handling similar matters. The use of a currently existing agency
would also provide the best answer to the limited number of cases
of this type that might be brought. It is anticipated that the volume
of litigation would be small 74 and thus a specialized agency could
better supply evenhanded treatment. Also, professional organizations could establish arbitration boards to handle such cases with
further referral to the courts.
171. With respect to the role of the judiciary in creating new judicial remedies see Peck,
The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REv. 265
(1963).
172. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973); Peterman v.
Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25, 29 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1959).
173. See, e.g., the establishment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
to prevent employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq. (1970), as amended, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq. (1970). It should be noted that the proposed cause of action could
be established through the regulatory powers of some federal agencies. These regulations
could provide that unless discharged professional employees were compensated, the firm
would be barred from practicing before that agency. See note 133 supra. On the state level,
jurisdiction could be granted to hear claims dealing with licensed professional employees.
There would, of course, be obvious but not undue difficulties in defining the term "professional."
174. A letter from Mr. John Bonomi, Chief Counsel to Committee on Grievances, the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York (February 25, 1975), stated that Mr. Bonomi
had not encountered any situation involving the discharge of a professional employee for
resistance to superior orders but he gave no opinion on the possible frequency of unreported
incidents.
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V.

CONCLUSION

It has been demonstrated that under current law, the "abusively discharged" professional employee has no real recourse
against his employer. This note has attempted to fashion such a
right and to offer different alternatives for affording relief. This
remedy is not designed to result in a flood of suits against professional employers, for it is hoped that the burden of proof and prerequisites to recovery will deter spurious actions. In a sense, the employee will not be relieved of any burden regarding unethical conduct, but in reality will be put in a position of greater responsibility.
Once the associate or junior accountant is protected from discharge
by the creation of a right to recovery, far less excuse exists for his
acquiescence to unethical superior orders or for the failure to raise
ethical questions. Previously, the fact that action was taken as a
result of superior commands would be held in mitigation in any
proceeding against the employee.'75 If the employee is otherwise
protected, however, no reason exists to mitigate possible sanctions.
Thus, the employee may be put into a position of greater responsibility, a responsibility to refrain zealously from unethical conduct.
From another point of view, the employer must be protected
from vexatious or abusive complaints by disgruntled employees. It
is hoped that actions for abuse of process could deter vexatious
suits, but if not, perhaps the employee could be subject to professional sanctions for the filing of such complaints. This could involve
public censure, or perhaps a suspension.
An unsolved problem will be the source of any remedy for the
discharged professional. Given the recent decision in Monge it may
be likely that judicial expansion of common-law principles will provide the greatest potential for change. Further, with the intimate
role of the judiciary in the achievement of high professional standards for attorneys, the courts could easily find that the instant
remedy is a necessary expansion of its supervisory powers. While
judicial control is not as strong with respect to other professionals,
common-law relief for them also would be appropriate.
Finally, a strong possibility of legislative action exists. Similar
types of statutes regulate other sectors of the population and it
should be recognized that if any class requires such protection it
should be the professionals. They are statutorily regulated in both
their qualifications and conduct. Consistent with this regulation a
type of job security should be granted to those professions whose
actions greatly affect the affairs of the public.
JON
175.
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